This paper is organized as follows.
In section 2, we sketch some of the theoretical arguments on the economic effects of alternative sharing arrangements.
The existing econometric literature on these effects is partially surveyed in the third section. Finally, we offer a few concluding comments.
II. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
In this section we outline some theoretical arguments on the economic effects of alternative sharing arrangements on the economic performance of the firm. Our review will be brief because in general economic theory does not provide unambiguous conclusions. We will focus on five main measures of productivity argument is not derived from a formal model, the presumption is that profit sharing improves morale, thereby increasing effort and reducing absenteeism and labor turnover. (However, Jensen and Heckling (3.919 ) dispute the claim that profit sharing enhances productivity. See below.) The lower turnover rate would reduce training costs and might be associated with more firm-specific human capital investments. If profit sharing raises the marginal and average product of labor at each level of employment, then a profit sharing firm will employ more workers at a given level of pay than a conventional fixed wage firm (Bradley and Estrin (1987) ). However, the higher average product of labor implies that a profit sharing firm will, other things equal, employ fewer workers at a given level of output.
The second traditional argument is that remuneration would be more flexible under profit sharing. Thus, compensation would respond more quickly to unanticipated aggregate demand or aggregate supply shocks under profit sharing than under a fixed wage system in which wages are set by long-term contracts.
This in turn implies that a profit sharing firm should exhibit less employment variability.
The third argument is one that is due to Weitzman. Weitzman considers a "share economy" in which most or all firms have adopted profit sharing and contrasts this economy to one populated by conventional firms. The key element in Weitzman's case for a profit sharing system is that such a system would likely be characterized by an excess demand for labor. In contrast, the conventional fixed wage economy would likely experience excess labor supply or labor market clearing. In a share economy in which firms compensate workers with both a base wage and a share of profits, labor shortages may arise because firms will want to hire workers to equate the value of the marginal product of a labor to the base wage (the marginal cost of labor) rather than to total remuneration. If the base wage is set sufficiently low, demand for labor would exceed the available supply, which is determined by total remuneration. One implication of an excess demand for labor is that a negative aggregate demand shock would increase unemployment by a smaller amount than under a fixed wage system.
Weitzman's theoretical case for profit sharing has been criticized for its sensitivity to a number of its assumptions, especially those related to whether the base wage or total remuneration is the marginal cost of labor and to how the firm and its employees bargain (for example, see Estrin and Wilson (19861, Blanchflower and Oswald (1987a) , and Estrin, Grout and Wadhwani (1987) However, Weitzman (1986) argues that investment might be higher in a profit sharing system than in a fixed wage system. One reason for Weitzman's favorable outlook is that output will be stabilized near the full-capacity level.
In contrast to the positive effects on employment that some researchers expect for profit sharing, the standard model of a labor-managed firm implies that employment will be lower in worker cooperatives than in conventional firms (Benin and Putterman (1986112. The key feature of the model underlying this outcome is that the objective of the worker coop is to maximize income per worker rather than total profits. Members of worker cooperatives have an incentive to restrict employment to avoid diluting their share of the firm's profits.
The argument that productivity would be higher in a worker cooperative than in a conventional firm is similar to the one given above for profit sharing.
However, worker participation in decision-making might be a source of an additional improvement: workers in participatory firms might exhibit more cooperative behavior which would reduce the costs of monitoring a worker's effort (Fitzroy and Kraft (19873) ). Thus, financial sharing and worker participation in decision-making might have reinforcing effects on productivity.
The opposing view is given in Jensen and Meckling (19791, who argue that the cost of monitoring workers increases with the degree of worker participation in decision-making: the more monitors, the higher the cost.
Horeover, if workers share in the firm's profits, managers will have a greater incentive to shirk their monitoring function. Thus, Jensen and Meckling predict that productivity will be lower in participatory firms.
The dominant view is that labor-managed firms will underinvest (see, for example, Vanek (19751, and Furubotn and Pejovich (1970) ). The main argument is that members of labor-managed firms are unable to recover their share of retained earnings because some of these earnings become part of the collective reserves.
Thus, members require a higher than normal return on investment projects, which implies some profitable projects are not undertaken.
The employment and productivity effects of employee share ownershi? schemes is expected to depend upon the type of scheme (Estrin, Grout, and Wadhnani (1987) Here the economic theory is best developed for the labor-managed firm. While most authors have expounded theories which imply that all labor-managed firms will display a life cycle, they disagree over the underlying determinants and ultimate consequences of the degeneration process. Some analysts stress both the structure of ownership and capital formation (see Vanek (19751, while others point to the use of hired labor (see Miyazaki (1984) or Ben-Ner (1984) Fitzroy and Kraft (1986 Kraft ( , 1987a However, the quality of the data on financial performance (their measure was a dummy variable indicating if the establishment's financial performance was viewed by its managers to be above average) suggests that one should be cautious in drawing general inferences.
The remaining studies that we survey estimated production functions that were augmented by variables measuring various forms of participation. This approach has also been used to investigate issues such as the effects of unionization on productivity (see Brown and Medoff (1978) Here they found that participation in decisions over wages uniformly had a positive effect on productivity, but participation in decisions over production is not statistically significant. However, their sample was characterized by very little participation over production so that they were not surprised that this form of sharing did not have an effect. Returning to the U.S. one of the first major studies was by Conte and Tannenbaum (reported in 1978, 19801 .' For a sample of 98 firms with employee ownership (including PCs) they found that companies with more employee ownership had higher profits relative to companies with less employee
ownership. An attempt was made to control for the effect of worker participation in decision-making: this factor was not found to be associated with higher relative profits. While the authors concluded that their findings were suggestive of a link between employee ownership and profitability, the limitations that often handicap pioneering studies, e.g., a small sample that is probably subject to selection bias and a crude measure of de jure participation --necessarily mean that one must be very cautious in accepting this conclusion. 
